Inequality and Stratification: Class, Color, and Gender

Second Edition

Robert A. Rothman
University of Delaware

1993

Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632

Part Two

Social Class in America

The United States can be divided into five broad social classes, with a small wealthy and influential elite at the top of the stratification system and a broad base of employed and jobless poor at the bottom. The majority of the society is ranged between these two extremes with an upper middle class of managerial and professional people, a lower middle class of technical, clerical and sales workers, and a working class of manual workers.

Chapter 4 traces the evolution of the "dominant ideology" of individual effort and responsibility and a set of perceptions and beliefs about the poor, women, and people of color that supports and legitimizes their position in the class system. Chapter 5 provides a broad overview of the class system in America and establishes a link between class standing and family structure and dynamics. Chapter 6 explores the way in which people think about the class system and their place in it.

Chapter 4

Institutionalizing and Legitimizing Inequality

ON THE ORIGINS AND MAINTENANCE OF STRATIFICATION SYSTEMS

The social, economic, and political changes accompanying industrialization divided American society into a system of five broad social classes. Class position has broad social and economic consequences, including expansion or limitation of opportunities. However, recognition of the nature and effects of class has in the United States been overwhelmed by an emphasis on the individual effort and performance that tends to deemphasize the structural.

Two analytically separate processes are involved in the origin and maintenance of structured inequality. Therefore, it is helpful to differentiate between the "institutionalization" and the "legitimation" of inequality. The institutionalization of stratification refers to the process of establishing various forms of structural inequality—the systematic exclusion of categories of people from education, housing, and well-paying jobs is one dimension of the process. In contrast, the rationale or justification for such discriminatory treatment is a different process, a process that sociologists refer to as legitimation. The two processes interact, and cannot be understood independent of one another.

The Institutionalization of Inequality

The *institutionalization* of inequality refers to the collection of laws, customs, and patterns of interaction that combine to produce inequality based on class, color, and gender. Discriminatory laws and codes have often played a role in this process. For example, African Americans were long formally excluded from labor unions, schools, and neighborhoods, and the exclusion of women from combat roles in the military survived long after other forms of legal discrimination were toppled. In other cases inequality is based on custom or openly accepted informal social understandings.

Early in this century contractors openly advertised to pay "whites" $1.50 per day and $1.15 to "Italians" (Feagin, 1984: 123).

The institutionalization of inequality is supported by a variety of social and political forces. In extreme cases sheer force and intimidation are used to create and maintain inequality. The period between the American Civil War and World War II in the South witnessed the exercise of both private (the Klan) and public violence and intimidation. As late as the 1940s, city police departments were involved in forcibly providing workers for the cotton plantations (James, 1988). However, institutionalized privilege, discrimination, exclusionary practices, and violence seldom cannot exist in social isolation; it is typically legitimized in some manner.

Legitimation and the Ideology of Inequality

Robert Nisbet (1970: 183–184) explains legitimation in this way, using the term status in lieu of class:

> No (position) will long survive widespread belief in its loss or lack of legitimacy. Ages that are truly revolutionary...are ages in which the sense of legitimacy regarding the status system of a social order terminate rather sharply. The traditional prerogatives of high status in the society are challenged, and the traditional limits put upon low status are seen as so many illegitimate fetters, to be cast off. The high status of the patriarch, the man of knowledge, the businessperson, or of the titled aristocrat will survive only so long as a determining part of the population...regards each as legitimate, as properly entitling their possessors to the privileges which go with their status.

Thus, in the context of stratification, the term legitimation refers to the evolution of social definitions and social beliefs that support, rationalize, and justify patterns of inequality. When these ideas are organized into a more or less consistent collection of definitions and ideas, they may be said to form an *ideology*. An obvious example of an ideology is the caste system idea that lower castes are ritually impure. A different illustration is the belief that slaves are inherently inferior, docile, and born to be enslaved. Current terms such as "racism" and "sexism" must be used in this way if they are to have any meaning—as organized beliefs and ideas that support discrimination against socially defined groups. It is important to emphasize that ideologies need not be logically consistent, nor based on an accurate picture of the situation.

Several points about ideology must be understood at the outset. First, the elements of an ideology may be consciously recognized and accepted by dominant members of society or they may operate below the conscious level. Long-standing ideologies often enjoy the force of tradition. Patterns are learned and passed on to subsequent generations through the social-

ization process, and seem to have no other justification than their antiquity. This kind of ideology is often evident in *social stereotypes*, tacit, often unrecognized, beliefs and assumptions about categories of people.

Second, ideologies may be elaborate and coherent systems of ideas, deliberately promulgated by a dominant group, or they may be loose collections of ideas that emerge in the process of every-day social relations among groups. In the former category are formal or explicit ideologies developed and advanced by specific groups, and that justify inequality (Barrera, 1979: 198). For example, medieval European aristocrats espoused the position that they were the descendants of the Teutons (later called Aryans) who had defeated the Romans, and commoners were descendants of the Romans and other inferior cultures. Members of the aristocratic class were thus members of the line responsible for the flowering of Western civilization and hence destined to rule. Later versions of this civilization ideology showed up in the United States in this century among those who sought to erect barriers to the influx of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe. Not all ideologies are deliberately created (Shibutani & Kwan, 1965: 248). Rather, they may be understood as emerging in a more unsystematic way when certain ideas are selected out and embraced simply because they can be interpreted to justify inequality.

Understanding the analytic distinction between institutionalization and legitimation is vital to understanding the dynamics of inequality. The two processes interact to create and support a stratification system; one has little meaning independent of the other. This distinction is also important in understanding the persistence of inequality through time. Discriminatory practices may be outlawed or discredited, but underlying ideologies (attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes) may persist long after formal barriers to opportunity have crumbled. Any number of contemporary examples can be phrased in this way. Blue-collar workers when compared to white-collar workers enjoy less social prestige; how this pattern emerged is one question, but why it continues may be a different question. Black workers began to be systemically excluded from some craft unions late in the nineteenth century is one issue, but why this pattern has continued into the 1990s in some instances, is another matter. The question of the origins of pay differentials between women and men is different than the issue of contemporary manifestation of monetary inequities.

CLASS AND THE IDEOLOGY OF STRATIFICATION

Contemporary American attitudes and perceptions of the class structure and distribution of inequality continue to be influenced by a complex system of ideas, the origins of which can be traced to the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. A key element in this religious philosophy was the emphasis individual responsibility for one's own fate

(both religious and secular). Puritans brought this individualistic spirit with them, and it came to form the centerpiece of the American cultural value system. The importance of independence and self-reliance was solidified and elaborated by the unique circumstances of a frontier society and later by the celebration of emerging capitalism.

This is often called the *dominant stratification ideology*, and when reduced to its most basic form may be phrased as follows (Huber & Form, 1973; Feagin, 1975; Klugel & Smith, 1986):

a. There are abundant economic opportunities.
b. Individuals should be industrious and competitive.
c. Rewards in the form of jobs, education, and income are, and should be, the result of individual talent and effort.
d. Therefore, the distribution of inequality is generally fair and equitable.

Although there may be a weakening in the power of this ideology, especially since World War II, it continues to have relevance for significant segments of the population. The origins of this ideology may be traced to the Protestant Reformation, but it also had some unique American features.

The Puritan Ethic

Protestantism of the sixteenth century must be understood as a rejection of the elaborate bureaucracy of the Catholic church and the doctrine that a Christian was unable to achieve salvation without the active help of the church. Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin emphasized the individual's responsibility for his or her own actions and fate. Work was a key part of individual responsibility. Prior to the Reformation, all work except religious endeavors was perceived as a burden to be endured as a means of survival. Martin Luther elevated all occupations to the level of "a calling," arguing that every form of work played an integral part in God's worldly plans. Influential ministers demanded relentless industriousness in pursuit of a person's occupation, no matter how menial. Hard work offered countless rewards; it was intrinsically worthwhile, but also was a way of serving God and a protection against the temptations of the secular world. More than one Calvinist theologian defined lack of employment as a crime or a sin. The unemployed were, in several colonies, subject to imprisonment or whipping (Feagin, 1975: 25).

There can be little question that Benjamin Franklin was the chief spokesperson for this Puritan ethic. Writing in 1726 he resolved, "To apply myself industriously to whatever business I take in hand, and not divert my mind from my business by any foolish project of growing suddenly rich;

for industry and patience are the surest means to plenty" (Franklin, 1961: 183). It was these traits that attracted the attention of Max Weber, who argued they fostered the spirit of capitalism.

There was also religious sanction for social inequality, for economic success, or the lack of it, became associated with personal character and virtue. For a brief historical period, Calvinists proclaimed wealth as a worldly sign of God's grace, for God would certainly not allow the damned to prosper. Hence, if persons are responsible for their own economic fate, failure must be an indication of some personal defect. Some groups, such as the Quakers, spoke out against this view, but without much impact, and the powerful emphasis on individual responsibility for success or failure was established.

The Frontier and the Land of Opportunity

The American version of Puritan individualism was supported and reinforced by the abundant opportunities that existed here, and none was more important than the lure of the western frontier. The frontier was much more than a distant geographic boundary, it was a symbol of unlimited opportunity (Turner, 1920). The image of plentiful land on the western frontier created a convenient mythology for the nation. There was no reason for anyone to fail, for there was always the vast untapped land to the west, with prosperity awaiting the strong and talented who were willing to seize the opportunity. This image was fostered in the mid-nineteenth century with discovery of gold in California, and in 1862 the passage of the Homestead Act guaranteed cheap land to everyone. The inherent risks—the desire to displace the native population, unchartered land, social isolation, and lack of law and order merely emphasized the rewards for the self-reliant. This led to the celebration of the rugged individualist, perhaps symbolized by the cowboy.

This ideology could flourish in a largely agrarian economy with an abundance of inexpensive land, and lacking traditional class barriers to success (with the notable exception of slaves). Industrialization offered a different kind of opportunity, urban jobs, and because the nation was a leader in industrial development it soon became the "land of opportunity." The image of a nation of apparently limitless economic opportunity was to attract waves of immigrants fleeing from poverty and famine in their native lands. Most non-English immigrants met with discrimination and open hostility, and were typically relegated to the least rewarding work in the factories. Yet their economic status was often better than it would have been in the lands they abandoned, and there were enough opportunities for economic success for those from humble origins to support the belief system. Those who did not themselves prosper were sustained by the notion that their children would enjoy the benefits of a better life.

Social Darwinism

An ideology of individualism and self-reliance has more salience and appeal in an agricultural society of independent craftspersons and small household farms. With the emergence of laissez-faire capitalism, increasing numbers of persons become employees of others, subject to their authority. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a different variation of the dominant ideology, more suited to an industrial economy, emerged. Charles Darwin published *On the Origin of the Species* in 1859, and soon it became the basis for a full-blown social ideology. Themes such as the "struggle for survival" and "survival of the fittest" were appropriated from a biological theory of evolution and grafted onto an economic system. John D. Rockefeller, speaking at a church school, explained: "The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest....This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of God" (Feagin, 1975: 35).

Soon thereafter the sociologist William Graham Sumner lent academic legitimacy to Social Darwinism in his discussion of the rich: "(M)illionaires are a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirement of certain work to be done....They may fairly be regarded as the naturally selected agents of society....There is the intensest competition for their place and occupation (and) this assures us that all who are competent for this function will be employed in it" (Sumner, 1914: 90).

Therefore, he concluded, there should be no attempt to redistribute wealth or interfere with the evolutionary process. He believed that hard work could triumph over the most humble circumstances. Hence he had these words of advice for the impoverished urban worker: "Let every man be sober, industrious, prudent and wise, and bring up his children to be so likewise, and poverty will be abolished in a few generations" (p. 57).

Challenges to the Ideology of Individualism

Americans still generally identify their country as a land of opportunity, although increasing numbers are expressing some skepticism. A clear trend is evident in adherence to the belief that there is "plenty of opportunity" in the United States: 88 percent endorsed this statement in 1952, 78 percent in 1966, and 70 percent in 1980 (Kluegel & Smith, 1986: 46). It must be assumed that general perceptions reflect a degree of sensitivity to the well-publicized declining economic position of the United States in the global economy, and the perceived threat to jobs caused by worldwide economic competition. In addition, it reveals an awakening (or perhaps a public acknowledgment) of the fact that structural barriers to access prevail, especially for minorities, women, and the poor.

The themes of individualism, self-reliance, and boundless opportunity were difficult to sustain when the Great Depression struck. More than 6 million workers were thrown out of work between 1929 and 1930, and that figure doubled by the mid-1930s. No amount of individual effort could protect them from joblessness. The economic chaos of the period stimulated government intervention in the economic system, and social welfare legislation such as unemployment insurance and the social security system for older workers were instituted.

Further challenges to the situational and structural limits on individual achievement surfaced during the turmoil of the 1960s. The civil rights and women's movements and the rediscovery of persistent structural poverty left little doubt that discrimination and structural barriers placed artificial limits on the chances of economic success for many segments of American society. Social scientists marshalled evidence that allocated responsibility for lack of success in the economic system to failures of institutions such as the schools. These developments challenged exclusive reliance on individual success or failure and focused on social, political, and economic factors beyond the direct control of individuals, however highly motivated they might be.

Class Ideology in the 1990s

The ideology of opportunity and individualism that dominated American society and culture for much of its history survives, but flourishes more powerfully among some segments of the population than in others. Although ideologies are complex social phenomena, they can sometimes be highlighted by a single issue, a single topic, or a single question. Many social scientists believe that asking people to define the causes of wealth or poverty accomplishes this. "The poor" represent those at the bottom of the class structure, and beliefs about the reasons for their situation demand that people distill their feelings and attitudes into a single response.

When confronted with this question, Americans divide into three almost equal categories (see Exhibit 4.1). One segment of the population is willing to blame the poor themselves due to lack of effort, and another third locate the causes of poverty in circumstances beyond their control. The remaining third endorse the idea that both reasons must be considered. It should also be noted that this is not a neutral issue, for very few people have no opinion on this matter.

Subgroups within the general population diverge from the overall pattern. Men are somewhat more likely to subscribe to the importance of individual responsibility than women. As would be expected, racial minorities are more sensitive to structural rather than individual sources of poverty. Finally, lower-middle-class workers (clerical and sales) place

Exhibit 4.1
Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty

Group	Lack of Effort	Circumstances	Both	No Opinion
Overall	33%	34%	31%	2%
Sex				
Male	36	31	30	3
Female	29	37	31	3
Racial/ethnic group				
White	35	30	33	2
Nonwhite	15	67	16	2
Hispanic	11	44	38	7
Social class				
Upper middle	36	32	31	1
Lower middle	41	36	23	<1
Working	29	36	31	4
Not in labor force	31	37	31	4

Note: Data based on a national sample of 1,505 adults conducted during 1984. The question was worded as follows: "In your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person is poor—lack of effort on his own part, or circumstances beyond his control?"
Source: "Blame for Poverty." *The Gallup Report* no. 234 (March 1985), p. 24. Copyright © 1985 by The Gallup Report.

greater emphasis on personal effort than blue-collar workers, who are more inclined to stress structural factors. In addition, explanations based on individual effort are more likely to be found among older people and those with higher incomes.

More detailed analysis of individualist responses reveal the survival of the traditional values of Ben Franklin. The major causes of poverty are identified as the absence of some positive personal trait such as lack of thrift or proper money management, lack of effort, lack of ability and talent, or loose morals and drunkenness (Kluegel & Smith, 1986: 79). In contrast, when asked to explain the sources of great wealth, a majority favor factors such as personal drive, willingness to take risks, hard work, and initiative, although it is conceded that inherited wealth is some advantage. Those who emphasize social structure see the sources of wealth or poverty, success or failure originating with social barriers or in the circumstances that individuals confront in their own backgrounds. They assign the greatest weight to factors such as discrimination, exploitative wages, or failures of the school system.

A large group occupies the middle ground, endorsing elements of both extremes. On issue after issue we find large numbers of people taking the position that structural barriers exist but that individual effort also plays a role. These people refuse to accept a dichotomous explanation and *volunteer* the answer that poverty is the outcome of the interaction of these two explanations. The same pattern emerges in other surveys; for example, when asked if the government should improve the living standards of the poor or should they care for themselves, most people choose a middle ground that encompasses both points of view (E.C.L., 1987: 23).

The convergence of these various elements form the dominant ideology that stresses individual responsibility over structural position in understanding the rewards that people enjoy. This evident in the aversion to the term "social classes" in American society (DeMott, 1990). Acceptance of social classes admits that society is divided into levels whose opportunities and rewards are enhanced or limited by the workings of the economic system.

GENDER AND CLASS STRATIFICATION

Anthropologists and historians have compiled extensive analyses of gender roles in non-industrial societies, and documented that a sexual division of labor is a common feature of human societies (Chafetz, 1984; D'Andrade, 1966). Biological or physiological differences do not contribute a great deal to the explanation of gender differences because the tasks assigned to men in one society may be the province of women in another, and because they change over time. There are many instances of such diversity. Clerical work in the nineteenth century in the United States and Britain was a male domain, only becoming feminized as the twentieth century proceeded. Sales work in contemporary Philippines is dominated by women (69 percent female), but an almost exclusively male occupation (1 percent female) in the United Arab Emirates (Jacobs, 1989: 19). The conclusion that derives from this research is that gender is a social construct, reflecting the convergence of social, political, economic, and demographic forces.

Women have always formed part of the paid labor force, but the most dramatic increases have occurred in the last 4 or 5 decades. The rate of female participation has increased steadily and is expected to continue to expand. Overall rates of participation mask differences among women, with poor and blue-collar women and women of color apparently always more likely to be working for wages than their more advantaged counterparts. A dominant feature of employment is gender segregation with numerous jobs dominated by members of one sex or the other. Thus, origins of these enduring patterns can be traced to the industrial transformation that reshaped a largely agricultural society (see Kessler-Harris, 1982; Bose, 1987; Anderson, 1988).

From colonial times to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the individual household in the United States was the basic unit of production and consumption for the majority of the free white population. There were, of course, wealthy landowners and urban merchants at one extreme, and slaves and sharecroppers at the other extreme. It appears that labor in family farms was generally divided along gender lines, with men having primary responsibility for agricultural production and women largely responsible for the inner economy—food, clothing, and child care (Anderson, 1988). However, both sexes easily crossed these lines, with husbands involved in the socialization of children for adult community and religious roles, and being especially active in preparing sons to follow agricultural pursuits. Wives participated in production through keeping inventories, caring for livestock, supervising farm hands as well as helping with planting, cultivating, and harvesting during peak periods. Households were largely self-sufficient, but cash was needed for the purchase of equipment and services (such the milling of grain) and wives often produced the products and services that generated extra cash income, either by weaving, growing food on small plots, or even working as midwives (Jensen, 1980). This pre-industrial division of labor still survives on contemporary small independent farms (Boulding, 1980).

Gender and Work in the Nineteenth Century

The first stirring of industrialization began about the turn of the eighteenth century with the introduction of factories and textile mills. Displaced rural men and young women and children provided the labor force for those early factories. At first the women were the daughters of rural families who contributed to household income through paid work, but they were soon supplemented by foreign-born immigrants (Kessler-Harris, 1982). A major pool of low-paid labor was provided by the waves of Irish-Catholic immigrants that began to reach the United States in large numbers in the 1840s. The men worked the docks and the textile mills, built the railroads, dug the canals, and supplied farm labor. Wives, daughters, and single women were most likely to end up as domestic servants for the wealthier classes. In 1855, 75 percent of all domestic workers in New York City were Irish (Feagin, 1984: 93).

Historical convention locates the era of rapid industrialization to the period between the Civil War and World War I. One measure of the industrial transformation is the fact that within two decades after the Civil War industrial workers outnumbered farm workers for the first time in American history. The family farm did not disappear, but there was a shift toward commercial production for the market. Consequently, the urban household and industrial work became the center of attention. This was a decisive period in the evolution of gender roles, for it was during this period

that a number of forces combined to crystalize a more dichotomous separation of men's and women's occupational and social roles. It is also an extraordinarily complex period, as a number of different forces were at work.

A most obvious difference between agrarian and urban industrial economies is that the workplace became physically separated from the residence. That made it more difficult for women with child rearing obligations to combine domestic responsibilities with full-time paid work. Some continued in various forms of income-producing work at home. The wives of lower-middle and working class men were doing laundry at home or taking in boarders as a means of supplementing family income well into the 1920s and 1930s (Kessler-Harris, 1982; Jensen, 1980). Countless others did industrial "home work," jobs such as sewing clothing, making lace or buttons, or even rolling cigars that were decentralized in private homes on a piece-work basis.

Many women joined the labor force on a more or less full-time basis. Although census data of the time are notoriously unreliable, in 1900 at least one in four paid workers was female. Black women, their options severely limited by overt discrimination, were relegated to agricultural or domestic work while factory work was largely the province of young single white women, usually immigrants or the daughters of immigrants, who toiled under some of the worst working conditions in the disgraceful sweatshops. As a result women were active in fighting for improved working conditions, both in the larger trade union effort and in organizing along gender lines with groups such as National Women's Trade Union League (Bose, 1987: 275).

Some enduring forms of gender segregation of occupations emerged during this period. Women were often exploited as pawns in the struggle between employers and workers. For example, early working class solidarity between men and women in the printing industry was eroded over the course of the nineteenth century when unskilled women were used to displace skilled male printers or were employed as strikebreakers (Baron, 1980). Printers worried that the "petticoat invasion" threatened to depress their wages and undermine the skilled traditions of their craft. Consequently, gender cooperation faded in this and other areas, and women came to be perceived as competitors for scarce jobs. This pattern was repeated in many other craft unions leading to exclusionary practices that made the crafts the province of white males.

The segregation of occupations along gender lines was legitimized and fostered by a configuration of gender stereotypes and attitudes toward the appropriate social and occupational roles of men and women (Deaux & Kite, 1987: 97). These ideas did not emerge during this period, but were thrown into strong relief by the process of industrialization. In some cases gender-based beliefs were invoked as justification for occupational segregation as is evident in mass production industries where auto assembly

came to be dominated by men while 80 percent of electric light-bulb assembly was done by young women (Milkman, 1983: 166). One justification for this division of labor was that women had more skillful and delicate hands, and more patience for tedious work.

Gender stereotypes were specifically articulated to explain the rejection of women who sought to surmount occupational barriers. When, for example, Myra Bradwell sought a license to practice law in Illinois in the 1870s, she was refused by state courts and an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court also brought rejection. Her suit was denied on Constitutional grounds, but Justice Bradley located the decision in broader historical and social context:

> Law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things. (*Bradwell v. Illinois*, 1873: 141-142).

The male protector and defender ideology also had an economic dimension. For example, it was used to support the fight for a "family wage." The family wage issue was used by labors unions as a strategy for seeking improved wages for their male constituents on the grounds that it was the husband's responsibility to act as protector and provider for his family. Samuel Gompers, speaking in 1905, proclaimed, "In our time, ...there is no necessity for the wife contributing to the support of the family by working" (Foner, 1964: 224). There is a powerful residue of this concept in contemporary society for some husbands at all class levels tend to be resistant to accepting working wives as co-providers (see Chapter 5).

Another manifestation of this ideology surfaced in the early part of the century when a wide variety of protective legislation was introduced to protect women from workplace hazards. In retrospect, it is noted that considerations other than health were at stake, for most of the protected jobs were traditional male jobs and often the best paid. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1908 in *Muller v. Oregon*, ruled that special legislation for women was appropriate because women were not as strong as men, were dependent on men, and were the mothers of future generations. Perhaps the key feature of the decision was that it placed all women in a separate legal classification because all women were potential mothers. Legislation beginning in the 1960s largely eliminated this situation, although the exclusion of women of childbearing age from some jobs on the grounds of "fetal protection" was not eliminated until 1991. It is apparent from the perspective of the twentieth century, that the family wage, protective legislation, and occupational segregation benefited some men by excluding women from competition from the more lucrative jobs in the paid labor force.

The assumption that women and men have inherently inferior intellectual and psychological characteristics was reinforced by "scientific" research on sex differences. Craniometrists proceeded from the observation that there were average differences in stature, to conclude that this produced intelligence, leading social psychologist Gustave LeBon to conclude in 1879 that, "All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women recognize today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children and savages than to adult, civilized men" (Deaux & Kite, 1987: 93). Thus, the research was prompted by a belief that there were sex differences, and the findings (however unfounded they might have been), in turn, buttressed the belief.

Gender and Work in the Early Twentieth Century

While segregation along gender lines was occurring in the occupational sphere, households was also changing. Among the most important developments was the shift away from internal production for the family. This was largely an upper middle class phenomena, but the impact extended to other levels in the society because the lifestyles of this class were a model for others. Their new affluence combined with the introduction of mass produced clothing and prepared foods rendered home work less necessary, creating a "domestic void" by stripping women of meaningful work in form of goods and services for the family. They were caught up in the emergence of a home economics movement that transformed housework into an unpaid occupation (Ehrenreich & English, 1979). The home economics movement itself represented the convergence of several broader trends—wider availability of single-family homes, concern with the breakdown of the traditional, tightly knit family, the rise of scientific child-rearing, and medical science's discovery of the germ theory of disease (making wives responsible for cleanliness).

Advocates of Frederick Taylor who were seeking to rationalize the workplace also turned their attention to the home, encouraging housewives to study and analyze the best way to perform tasks such as peeling potatoes, maintaining household records, and holding to rigorous schedules. Out of this emerged a new social ideal for upper-middle class women, often called the "cult of domesticity." This ideal demanded dedication to home decoration, cleanliness, nutrition and meal planning, and child rearing. The cult of domesticity served to legitimize certain patterns. One was that it located the male role in the paid labor force (the public sphere), and female role in the home (the private sphere). It is not at all clear how many women were actually able to realize this ideal, for many working class wives, immigrants and women of color continued in the paid labor force but the ideal was spread through the media and advertising.

The flourishing upper-middle class ideal for homemaker flourished as the century progressed. Aided by technological innovations directed toward work in the home (vacuum cleaners and washing machines) and prompted by mass advertising and the proliferation of women's magazines, upper-middle class wives were expected to attain new heights in neatness and cleanliness in the home and in creative cooking. The more affluent could afford domestic servants, relegating unpleasant physical tasks to a corps of black women (Palmer, 1989). Continuing into the 1960s, housewives devoted increasing hours to housework. More importantly, wives' income and social status came to be defined by their husband's occupational attainments, and the expectation that personal success and satisfactions were subordinate to those of spouses and children.

Trends in occupational segregation that had been set in motion earlier intensified between the two world wars, as did the gender stereotyping of work. A whole range of occupations proliferated during this period, and they tended to split along gender lines. The professions—law, medicine, science, engineering—proliferated, but along sex lines. The feminization of clerical work began at the end of nineteenth century; women outnumbered men by the 1920s and by the 1990s held over 90 percent of clerical jobs such as bank teller, secretary, and typist. It has been suggested that men abandoned clerical work at least in part because it did not enable them to demonstrate masculine traits (Lockwood, 1958), but it may also have been influenced by the lack of mobility opportunities.

Work and Ideology Since the 1940s

World War II was to have a major impact on women's roles. The influx of women into the labor force to replace men in the armed services set the stage for the eventual blurring of the distinction between the public and private sectors. Women filled jobs of all kinds (in both civilian industry and the military), including those that they presumably lacked the psychological traits to master. As the war wound down, an overwhelming majority expressed a desire to remain in the work force, although many were eventually displaced to make room for returning servicemen. However, the rate of participation of women in the paid labor force was to begin an increase that has become permanent (Exhibit 4.2). An expanding economy created hundreds of thousands of new jobs. Older (over 45) married women with diminished child-rearing responsibilities were the first group to seek work in larger numbers, and since the 1970s it is younger married women.

Social and legal change diminished occupational barriers in some areas. Law schools, once an almost exclusively male domain now enroll approximately 40 percent women. However, the segregation of jobs along gender lines that emerged during earlier phases of industrialization often

Exhibit 4.2
Labor Force Participation Rates for Women, 1946–1987



Source: Susan E. Shank, "Women in the Labor Market: The Link Grows Stronger," *Monthly Labor Review*, 111 (March 1988), Chart 2, 5.

Exhibit 4.3
Gender Segregation in Selected Occupations, 1989

Occupation	Percentage Female
Auto mechanics	0.7
Carpenters	1.6
Aerospace engineers	3.7
Clergy	7.8
Dentist	8.6
Textile sewing machine operators	90.5
Registered nurses	94.2
Teacher, K and pre-K	97.8
Dental assistant	98.9
Secretary	99.1

Source: "Employed Civilians by Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin." *Employment and Earnings* 37 (January, 1990).

continues. This is underscored by examining the proportion of women in some specific occupations (Exhibit 4.3). The distorted occupational distribution is nicely summarized by one observation; three out of five employed women would have to shift jobs to match the distribution of employed men (Bella, 1984).

Contemporary Gender Beliefs

Large numbers of people hold a configuration of perceptions and beliefs about masculine and feminine traits. They may be defined as *gender beliefs* or *sex-trait stereotypes*, convictions and assumptions about the characteristics of women and men. All stereotypes are generalizations about groups of people. Members of a society may disagree over the origins of such traits, with some emphasizing inherent sex differences and others feeling they have their origins in socialization practices, but there is consistent evidence that gender beliefs do prevail. These generalizations are complex and varied and people certainly recognize diversity within each sex and seldom attribute the extremes of these traits to individuals, but there does appear to be a high level of consensus in American society and other industrial nations (Williams & Best, 1990).

Beliefs about the characteristics of women and men are a major factor in understanding their position in the class structure. Prompted by the cross-cultural work of anthropologists, the social scientific analysis of gender beliefs emerged during the 1940s and produced a wealth of information about the way members of society perceive gender. One consistent pattern that emerges is the perception that gender involves two broad clusters of traits. Men tend to be viewed as stronger and more active, with potent needs for achievement, dominance, autonomy, and aggression. Women are seen as less strong and less active, with powerful needs for affiliation, nurturance, and deference. Moreover, there is a general consensus (among both men and women) on these configurations of characteristics, and some indication that a number of these traits show up in other cultures (Williams & Best, 1990).[1]

Stereotypes are more than perceptions; they also have a normative dimension, setting broad standards for appropriate gender behavior. Such popular beliefs can work to the advantage or disadvantage of men and women in the occupational sphere in more than one way. If persons are persuaded of the salience of stereotypes, they can disqualify themselves

[1]Such findings articulate the debate over the relative contribution of differences grounded in sex differences as opposed to the impact of socialization practices. This debate is beyond the scope of this book, but there are a number of useful summaries of the issues and the research. See, for example, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), Fausto-Sterling (1986), and Williams and Best (1990).

from the pursuit of specific occupations. It is more likely that they are held back or disqualified as they encounter barriers based on the assumption that they lack the traits necessary to function in certain fields or at certain levels. For example, women lawyers who choose criminal defense confront perceptions that they lack the requisite "coolness" and "aggressiveness" required for success in the crucible of the courtroom. Ironically, displaying that competitive behavior can also be interpreted to their disadvantage. This dilemma is described by a lawyer, "If a woman lawyer begins to argue with another lawyer, it may seem...that (she) is becoming too emotional or agitated.... If a woman tries to be unemotional she may be accused by being hard or unfeminine" (Blodgett, 1986).

There is an important quality about the way in which people view these traits in the United States. They tend to be dichotomous and polar opposites. This means that there is a tendency to place a person in one category or another, masculine or feminine, with little tolerance for neutrality. In addition, if people are described as lacking one set of traits, it will be assumed that they possess the opposite. Thus, a male who is not dominant is assumed to be submissive; the female who is not warm is

CASE STUDY:
Sex-Trait Stereotypes and Management Careers

Research on sex-trait stereotypes is typically approached through the use of lists of adjectives. Male traits in the United States tend to cluster around terms such as independence, self-direction, and control, whereas female traits cluster around caring, expressiveness, and sensitivity to interpersonal relations. The following listing of adjectives in Exhibit 4.4, summarized from a broad body of research, provides an outline of the perceived attributes of women and men (Schein, 1973; Williams & Bennett, 1975; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Brenner, et al. 1989; Williams & Best, 1990. Attempts to capture the essence of these clusters in a single word or phrase has popularized expressions such as "instrumental," "competency," "task-orientation" or "agency" for men and "expressive," "social orientation," or "communion" for women.

The link between occupational attainments and stereotypes is highlighted by considering the characteristics, attitudes, and temperaments necessary for success in certain kinds of jobs. Management careers present a direct illustration. It is more common to associate male characteristics (aggressive, self-reliant, stable) than female characteristics (helpful) with success in management, at least among men (Schein, 1973; Brenner et al., 1989). This discontinuity between female sex traits and managerial success means that women are perceived as less likely to have abilities to compete in the high-powered world of administration. The characteristics of successful management may also be stereotypes, but their existence has the potential to place women at a disadvantage.

Exhibit 4.4
Perception of Male and Female Traits

Men	Women
active	affectionate
aggressive	changable
confident	emotional
courageous	gentle
daring	helpful
forceful	poised
inventive	sensitive
rational	sophisticated
stable	submissive
unemotional	sympathetic
unexcitable	warm

pictured as cold. This visualization of people falling into dichotomous/polar opposite categories is a general characteristic of the society, also showing up with respect to sexual preference: Homosexuals are assumed to possess the social traits of the other biological sex.

Dramatic social changes propelled into the public consciousness in the 1960s stimulated a reexamination of contemporary gender roles. It is conventional to date this development from 1963, when Betty Friedan labeled the middle-class ideal a "comfortable concentration camp" for women, but she merely touched a responsive chord in the society. Prompted by the second women's movement and other social changes, members of society became more sensitive to patterns of institutionalized inequality called into question the validity of the ideological legitimation of such inequities. Many formal, legal barriers to women's achievement fell during the 1970s, but inequalities remain, perpetuated by disadvantageous structural arrangements, deeply ingrained attitudes and beliefs inherited from earlier periods, and patterns of socialization that help to perpetuate them.

PEOPLE OF COLOR AND STRATIFICATION

Race or ethnicity is often the basis of relegating minorities to the lowest levels of society. There have been many different attempts to explain the origins and legitimation of minority stratification. All focus on the question of how the jobs reserved for minorities tend to the most unstable, hazardous, dead-end, undesirable, and lowest-paying forms of employment. These theories can be grouped in many different ways, but seem to fall into three categories.[2] One approach focuses on competition for scarce resources; a

[2] It is impossible here to do full justice to the many attempts to explain racial/ethnic stratification. There are several useful summaries and comparisons; see, for example, Barrera (1979, Chap. 7) or Feagin (1984 Chap. 2).

second, labeled colonialism, emphasizes deliberate coercive exploitation of minorities; and assimilation theorists emphasize the sociocultural disadvantages that minority group members suffer by placing them at a disadvantage in a system dominated by members of a different culture.

Competition Theories

Donald Noel (1968) maintains that the emergence of racial or ethnic stratification is the outcome of the interaction of three factors—ethnocentrism, competition for scarce resources, and the ability to exercise control. When groups of different racial, cultural, or religious backgrounds come in contact, they are often separated by feelings of *ethnocentrism*, the tendency of one group to view its own standards and perspectives as superior. The religious dimension is a prime example for most religious belief systems define their creed as "the one true faith," thus establishing an unequivocal basis for judgments of inferiority. Cultural values, by virtue of defining what is "right," operate in the same manner. Ethnocentrism thus emphasizes social differences among groups, but is not necessarily or inevitably a source of stratification, for there been instances of peaceful pluralism.

Stratification emerges, Noel argues, only when there is *competition for scarce resources*. Certainly the history of relations between native Americans and Europeans can be seen as a struggle for land that was eventually decided by the superiority of weaponry and military personnel. A different form of competition centers on jobs. Organized occupational groups frequently limit minority access. For example, the legal profession during the 1920s and 1930s erected barriers to limit the number of African American and East European immigrants (Auerbach, 1976). During the post–Civil War period the dramatic and relatively sudden competition for working-class jobs between blacks and whites was set in motion by emancipation. One estimate suggests that 100,000 of the artisans in the South in 1865 were black (Brooks, 1971: 243), and it is not surprising that some white artisans worried about the threat to their jobs posed by the newfound freedom of skilled black carpenters, blacksmiths, and tailors. The situation was, of course, more complex than just a struggle between working-class whites and African Americans for skilled jobs. Other groups had vested interests. Large landowners also stood to benefit from the presence of a large pool of black workers excluded from skilled blue-collar work, and thus available as a cheap labor force.

The subordination of a racial ethnic group ultimately depends on the ability to *control access* to such valued resources. Frequently, racial competition was settled by violence, either actual or threatened. However, exclusion of blacks from jobs also took less extreme forms. For example, white-controlled unions systematically excluded blacks from membership

and from apprenticeship programs, and unions prohibited their members from working with nonunion members, thus pressuring employers to exclude blacks (Foner, 1964). Such practices were part of some union constitutions into the 1940s.

Although the focus is on jobs, discriminatory behavior is not limited to the occupational sphere alone. It takes place within the larger context of exclusionary practices designed to keep minorities poor, uneducated, and powerless, thus discouraging competition and ensuring another generation of workers.

Internal Colonialism

Colonialism refers to a pattern of global political and economic expansion and exploitation by powerful nations over weaker nations. A number of people have expanded this approach to include processes that occur within the borders of a nation, and hence use the term internal colonialism (Blauner, 1972). The thesis is embedded in economic imperatives and it argues that non-native groups are explicitly exploited as a pool of low wage workers, thus generating profits for agricultural landowners or industrial employers. For example, Indians were encouraged or forced to enter South Africa in the nineteenth century to work the plantations. This approach can be used to illuminate the American experience of a number of nonwhite groups, starting with the forced importation of blacks as slaves, and continuing in the mid-nineteenth century with the importation of Chinese workers to work the mines and build the railroads, and on to the influx of Mexicans in this century to do fieldwork in the Southwest.

Assimilation Perspectives

The assimilation perspective grew out of an attempt to understand the experience of waves of immigrants to America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Gordon, 1964). The pattern occurred with newcomers from Ireland and Italy and is projected to be repeated for succeeding groups. Most members of each immigrant group tends to be concentrated at the lowest levels of society due to a combination of hostility and discrimination by members of the dominant group and their own characteristics (lack of marketable job skills, absence of educational credentials, language barriers) that handicaps them in the competition for work and homes.

The assimilation perspective predicts the decline in the salience of racial, ethnic, and religious differences over time as assimilation occurs along several different dimensions. Succeeding generations should be able

to improve their position by adopting the social and cultural attributes of the host society, a process called cultural assimilation. As this takes place the salience of their differences should decline allowing second and third generations to achieve structural assimilation, acceptance into neighborhoods, clubs and institutions of the host society, and ultimately marital assimilation as prejudice and discrimination decline. Research with this model has been unable to confirm the process for all groups, especially Hispanics and African Americans (e.g., Williams & Ortega, 1990). This issue is explored in more detail in Chapter 8 in the context of social evaluations and social relations.

Legitimation of Racial/Ethnic Inequality

Discriminatory and exclusionary practices interact with ideologies that define minorities as different and deserving of unequal treatment and rewards. There are important differences among the experiences of different groups such as blacks and Hispanics in the United States, but there are also some recurring themes.

Black Americans and the Ideology of Racism

The word racism refers to an ideology that defines physically different groups as having inferior intellectual and psychological characteristics (cf. Feagin, 1984: 5). Slavery was established in the colonies by the middle of the seventeenth century, and some historians suggest that Africans were enslaved because they were members of societies that were politically and militarily weaker. Others feel that a form of ethnocentrism—religious—was a major factor, initially more salient than race in legitimizing slavery. It is argued that the fact that Africans were non-Christian was the rationale for enslaving them (Franklin, 1974). There is little doubt that early accounts by traders and missionaries were often dominated by religious and cultural, rather than racial, considerations. As one put it, "cultivating none of the practices of civilized life as these are found among the rest of mankind" (quoted in Gordon, 1964: 25). Although the origins of negative attitudes are unclear, racist stereotypes were established and articulated by the eighteenth century. With the breakdown of legal sanction for slavery, elaborate pseudo-scientific theories of biological racism flourished. One was a theory of polygenesis, which held that the various races evolved at different times, and blacks, who theoretically evolved first, were consequently the most primitive. Moreover, this theory proclaimed that culture is the product of biological capacity, and hence less advanced races could neither create nor carry the culture of higher races.

Consequently, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many different themes were elaborated, all of which were said to

demonstrate that all African blacks exhibited biological and personality traits that handicapped them and justified discrimination. For example, it was long fashionable to stereotype blacks as "lazy" and "childlike," which makes it logical to exclude them from positions of authority and responsibility. Scholarly journals produced "scientific" evidence to prove the mental inferiority of blacks, thus justifying limiting their educational opportunities to inferior schools. Sexual images infiltrated also, with black women seen as lacking in conventional morals, thus providing some justification for the sexual exploitation of black women by white men.

There are, in addition, subcategories for women of color. One is the myth of the aggressive and domineering "strong black woman," having more masculine than feminine traits. Bell Hooks (1984) points out the usefulness of this stereotype in legitimizing broad patterns of racial inequality. The reasoning follows this logic: The strengths of black women violate broader social expectations of women and consequently emasculate black men and cause the breakup of the family, which in turn causes poverty. The function of the stereotype is thus to locate the causes of problems within the personality of the victims rather than focusing on structural problems that produce poverty.

The Case of Mexican and Chinese Women

Broad racist stereotypes directed at Mexicans can be traced to the middle of the eighteenth century through the selective perception and interpretation of events. The defeat of the Mexican army in the struggle for territory in the 1840s generated stereotypes of cowardice rather than a recognition of superior military force. A period of internal turmoil produced by the Mexican struggle for independence was transposed into "political incompetence," a people not capable of self-government.

Mexican women in the United States often faced special problems created by the work patterns imposed on their husbands by employers. Male Mexican workers working the mines, farms, and railroads in the Southwest were frequently required to leave their families behind and live in all-male labor camps (Glenn, 1987). In those cases families were disrupted and circumstances demanded that women single-handedly bear the burden of maintaining the family, albeit with the help of the extended family. This was not a unique case, but rather one that was frequently repeated. In the case of Chinese women in the middle of the nineteenth century wives were left behind in their native land, prohibited from immigrating with their spouses. There they often lived with their husband's kin, who received money from him and acted on his behalf. A few never saw their husbands again, and others only occasionally during rare visits back to China.

These are specific instances, but women of color tend always to face a common problem. Men of color are channeled into the worst-paying jobs

and because husbands earn minimum-level wages, wives are forced into the paid labor force to supplement family income, in addition to having responsibility for regular household chores. They, too, face the discriminatory environment of the larger society, and most end up concentrated in service work, as servants or domestics.

The Perpetuation of Stereotypes

Racial stereotypes and ideologies are transmitted through the socialization process and reinforced by countless social patterns, including such apparently trivial mechanisms as ethnic jokes. Given the pervasiveness of racism, it is not surprising that well into the 1960s at least one third of Americans admitted to a belief that blacks were intellectually inferior to whites, and favored the continuation of racially segregated neighborhoods (Brink & Harris, 1967). In the same period, a full one third of Californians endorsed the notion that Mexicans were "shiftless and dirty."

Overt manifestations of this ideology held sway well into the 1950s and 1960s, when it finally began to dissipate under the pressures of the civil rights movement. One indication of the decline in the legitimacy of racial ideology is measured by the weakening of negative stereotypes of blacks (Gordon, 1986). Moreover, survey research indicates that open manifestations of prejudice toward blacks declined steadily during the 1970s and mid-1980s (Schuman et al., 1988; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). This pattern holds for all regions of the country, including the South, and is explained in part by the fact that more younger and less prejudiced people are surveyed. All such data must be interpreted with some caution, for it has become socially unacceptable in some areas to express prejudice openly, and in fact, such expressions in some cases leave people liable to legal action.

In many cases, overt behavior belies the expression of more tolerant attitudes. A recent study by the Center for Democratic Renewal counted over 1,000 violent incidents directed against people of color during the 1980s, including assaults, shootings, and murders (Millican, 1988). There were, in addition, another 1,800 cases of vandalism and nonviolent harassment. Some acts are attributed to groups that openly hold to racial supremacist ideologies, a mix of relatively small activist groups, including self-proclaimed skinheads and a dozen different Ku Klux Klan groups. These groups tend to adhere to an extreme position that focuses on any race, religion, or sexual preference that deviates from white, heterosexual Protestantism. But many others are the acts of members of the general population, including a large number occurring on upper-middle-class college campuses.

CASE STUDY:
Ethnic Jokes

"Did you hear that their national library burned down? Not only were both books destroyed, but they hadn't finished coloring them."

Ethnic jokes and one-liners such as this are found in many societies, but those focusing on the alleged stupidity of ethnic minorities seems to be found only in western industrial democracies according to Christie Davies (1982). The following pattern of victimization of ethnic groups prevails:

Country	Ethnic Victims
Australia	Tasmanians
Canada	Icelanders
Denmark	Norwegians
England	Irish
France	Belgians
Sweden	Finns
United States	Poles

The enduring popularity of ethnic jokes and their place in the popular culture of these societies suggests they serve important social functions. The most obvious is that they perpetuate negative stereotypes about ethnic groups in a society, attributing a lack of intelligence to all members of the group. However, this does not explain why those groups are singled out as victims of these jokes, nor the importance of these traits. Davies suggests ethnic jokes emphasize the social and moral boundaries between a dominant group and ethnic minorities. By projecting negative traits to ethnics they reinforce their separation from them and elevate their own status. In addition, the jokes reaffirm the legitimacy of the stratification system for they are directed at groups in the class hierarchy and imply that the lower level of attainment is deserved and just.

CONCLUSION: American Dilemmas

The development of systems of inequality and social stratification is a complex process. On the one hand, mechanisms for the subordination of groups develop—exclusion from economically rewarding positions and opportunities for attaining them. The institutionalization of inequality is buttressed by ideologies such as sexism or racism that maintain that members of groups are inferior in some way—biologically, socially, behaviorally—that causes their position in the class system.

Gender and racial ideologies lend legitimacy to specific exclusionary practices, but it is important to note that they also function at a more general level. A phrase introduced by the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal (1944) in exploring the situation of black Americans is useful. He called attention to an "American dilemma": A society founded on democratic and individualist principles simultaneously discriminates against a proportion of its citizens, creating a moral contradiction. Ideologies function to resolve this apparent contradiction (Nash, 1962). Sexism or racism provides a moral justification for systematic deprivation by confirming that some members of the society are culturally or biologically inferior. In that way it allows members of the dominant group to reconcile obvious discrepancies between societal values (e.g., democracy) and discriminatory behavior.

Recent research illustrates the dynamics of this process with respect to African Americans. The 1980s was a period in which fewer Americans came to attribute the concentration of blacks at lower levels of the class system to innate differences between the races (Kluegel, 1990). However, individualist interpretations focusing on the dominant ideology of personal motivation still tend to eclipse explanations that emphasize structural barriers. A survey that asked white Americans how they felt about blacks compared to whites reveals that 62 percent see blacks as less hardworking (6 percent define them as more hardworking) and 53 percent as less intelligent (14 percent more intelligent) (Kanamine, 1991). It is important to note that this position is widely held, even among people who do not favor traditional discriminatory practices such as residential segregation. The coexistence of these beliefs contributes to an understanding of the common paradox, a belief in racial equality coexisting with a lack of support for policies to reduce racial inequalities (Kluegel, 1990).

ADDITIONAL READINGS

On Class Stratification

BENJAMIN DEMOTT. *The Imperial Middle: Why Americans Can't Think Straight About Class*. New York: Morrow, 1990.

RICHARD HOFSTADER. *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Boston: Beacon, 1955.

JOAN HUBER and WILLIAM H. FORM. *Income and Ideology*. New York: Free Press, 1973.

JAMES R. KLUEGEL and ELIOT R. SMITH. *Beliefs About Inequality*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1986.

On Gender Stratification

ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS. *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

CHARLOTTE G. O'KELLY and LARRY S. CARNEY. *Women and Men in Society: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender Stratification*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986.

BARBARA F. RESKIN and PATRICIA A. ROOS. *Job Queues, Gender Queues*. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990.

SHEILA M. ROTHMAN. *Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present*. New York: Basic Books, 1978.

JOHN E. WILLIAMS and DEBORAH L. BEST. *Measuring Sex Stereotypes: A Multination Study*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990.

On Minority Stratification

RODOLFO ACUNA. *Occupied America: A History of Chicanos*. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.

BART LANDRY. *The New Black Middle Class*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

WILLIAM P. O'HARE, KEVLIN M. POLLARD, TAYNIA L. MANN, and MARY M. KENT. *African Americans in the 1990s*. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1991.

ALPHONSO PINKNEY. *The Myth of Black Progress*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

WILLIAM J. WILSON. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.